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I. 	 INTR.ODUCilON 
In 1996, the United States Supreme Court decidedML.B. v. S.L.J,1 its most 
recent decision concerning termination ofparental rights.2 The Court held that 
where a state provides an appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, 
it must, under the U.S. Constitution's due process and equal protection 
•A.uociatc Professor, University ofMaine School ofLaw; B.A., Yale College; J.D., Harvard 
Law School. Thanks to Katharine K. Baker, Naomi R. Cahn, Scott Gould, Lois Lupica and Dean 
Colleen Khoury for reading drafts; John McDuff and Rick Moore for providing background 
information;Dennis Carrillo, Tanya Floerchinger, Karen Kimball and Rebekah Smith for research 
usistanoe; and Ruth Miner for administrative assistance. Thanks also to the Law and Society 
Association for an opportunity to present an early version of this work at its 1998 Annual 
Meeting, the New Words Salon for an opportunity to present an early version, and the University 
of Maine School ofLaw for research funding. I want to particularly thank my colleague Lois 
Lupica at University ofMaine School ofLaw for her support and insights. Responsibility for any 
CJTOI'1, is ofcourse, mine. 
1. 519 u.s. 102 (1996). 
2. The M.L.B. v. S.L.J. decision was 6-3, with Justice Kennedy concurring. /d. at 128. 
Justice Thomas and Justice Rehnquist tiled separate dissenting opinions. /d. at 129. Justice Scalia 
jeined Justice Thomas' dissent; Justice Rehnquistjoined in part in Justice Thomas• dissent /d. 
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mandates, provide indigent appellants with a transcript if a transcript is 
necessary to review the decision? To reach this result, Justice Ginsburg, writing 
for the majority, bad to navigate unfavorable precedentholdingthat due process 
did not require states to provide an appeal4 and that indigent parents did not 
have an absolute rightto counsel in terminationofparental rights cases.5 ML.B. 
strongly endorses parental rights against state authority, and on remand, the 
Mississippi courts ultimately reversed the initial tennination ofthe petitioner's 
parental rights.6 Similarly, the Supreme Court's recent plurality decision in 
Troxelv. Granville,' involving the constitutionality ofWashington state's third 
party visitation statute in the context ofgrandparent visitation, also endorsed 
parental rights.8 Troxel, however, involved very different circumstances, and 
its ultimate significance is not clear because of the splintered nature of the 
decision.9 
3. /d. at 107. States were not required to provide an appeal, but once they did, they could 
not deny indigent defendants a transcript. !d. at 111, 128. 
4. /d. at 110-11. See Griffin v.Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (plurality opinion) (holding 
states are not constitutionally required to provide appellate review in civil cases). 
S. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 117-18. See Lassiterv. Dept. of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18,31-32 
(1981) (stating parents have no absolute right to counsel in termination ofparental rights cases; 
right depends on character and diflicuJty ofcase). 
6. Following the Supreme Court,s remand, ML.B., armed with a transcript, was able to 
successfully appeal the tennioation ofparentalrights decision. SeeM.L.B. v. SLJ., No. 97-CA­
00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *40 (Miss. Ct. App. May 18, 1999). This was 
recently affamed by the Mississippi Supreme Court. M,L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 97-CT-00929-SCT, 
2000 Miss. LEXIS 93 (Miss. Apri120, 2000). See infra notes 76-79, 96-115. 
7. 120 S.Ct. 2054 (2000) (plurality opinion). 
8. /d at2057. 
9. In Troxel, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court found that Washington's 
broadly worded third party visitation statute, as applied in that case, was an unconstitutionaJ 
infringement ofa parent's right to raise her children without state interference.ld. at 2063. The 
W asbington Supreme Court had held that the statute wasunconstitutionaJ on its face under federal 
law because it was oyerbroad and did not require a showing ofharm to a child before vi~itation 
could be ordered.ld. at 2058-59. At the United States Supreme Court level, the plurality offour 
justices, in an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, found the lawwas unconstitutional as applied 
to the dispute at hand. ld. at 2063. The dispute was between a mother and the parents of her 
deceased boyfriend, over the extent ofthe grandparents' visitation with the children.Jd. at 2057. 
The trial court had ordered more visitation to the grandparents than the mother wanted to allow. 
/d at 2057-58. There had been no cJaim that the mother was unfit, the trial court had given no 
weightto the mother's evaJuation ofthe children's interest. and the mother was not seeking to cut 
off visitation entirely. /d. at2061-63. As appJied to these circumstances, where the trial court hod 
ordered a specific visitation schedule for the grandparents, the plurality held that the law 
unconstitutionally infringed on the mother's parental rights. Jd. at 2063. The concurrences of 
Justices Souter and Thomas took contrasting positions, with Justice Souter saying that the 
Washington Supreme Court should have affirmed the lower court's holding that the statute was 
overbroad and facially unconstitutional because it interfered with parents• rights as set forth in 
Supreme Court precedents. Jd. at 2065-2067. Justice Thomas' concurrence argued that strict 
scrutiny should have been applied to the statute since it interfered with fundamental rights and 
also noted that the validity ofthe parental rights precedents had not been challenged, implying that 
be might find those precedents incorrectly decided. It!. at 2067-68. Justice Scalia dissented, 
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The purpose ofthis Essay is to examine and raise questions about certain 
aspects of the Court's ML.B. decision which are distinct from the narrowly 
doctrinal aspects ofthe decision. 10 The goal is not to assert that the decision is 
"right'' or "wrong," but rather to discuss family law issues related to the 
decision in light ofthe Supreme Court's decision and subsequent decisions in 
the case. The Court's decision and contemporary family law more generally 
make certain core assumptions. These assumptions include the following: (1) 
child custody decisionmaking11 is fundamentally different from tennination of 
parental rights decisionmaking; (2) the advocacy system is the best forum for 
deciding termination of parental rights disputes; (3) stepparent adoptions are 
arguing that the matter should be left to the states.Id at 2074-75. Justices Kennedy and Stevens 
wrote separate dissents, both arguing that the lower court's decision should be reversed.Id at 
2075-79 (Kennedy), and 2068-74 (Stevens) . As Troxel dealt with grandparent visitation rather 
than tennination ofparental rights, it is not directly on point. Moreover, the narrow wording of 
the plurality decision, discussing the statute only "as applied," and the divergent analysis ofthe 
concurrenoes limits its significanoe in this context. However, both decisions pertain to parental 
rights, and the language of the Troxel opinion is interesting in light of the M.L.B. decision so 
Troxel will be discussed herein to the extent that it is pertinent. 
10. The strictly constitutional aspects ofthe decision have been discussed elsewhere. See 
generally Lloyd C. Anderson, The Constitutional Right ofPoor People to Appeal Without 
Payment ofFees: Convergence ofDue Process and Equal Protection in M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 32 U. 
MICH. J. L. REFoRM 44 I (1999) (stating that M.LB. expands the constitutional right ofcost-free 
appeal to a limited range ofcivil cases); Robert B. McDuff, M.L.B. V. S.LJ. and the Right of 
Poor People to Go to Court, 18 MISS. C. L. REV. 5 (1997) (discussing M.L.B. in the context of 
constitutional law and indigents' access to court); Rick Moore, M.L.B. v. S.LJ.: Extension of 
in fonnapauperis.Appeals to the Civil Arena in Termination ofParental Rights Cases, 18 Mrss. 
C. L. REv. 19 (1997) (describing the majority opinion as an amalgamation ofthe Due Process 
Clause and Equal Protection Clause); Julie A. Nice, The Emerging Third Strand in Equal 
Protection Jurisprudence: Recognizing the Co-Constitutive Nature ofRights and Classes, 1999 
U. ILL. L. REv.1209 (finding thatM.L.B. can be better understood by including an evaluation of 
the interaction between rights and classes to typical equal protection jurisprudence); J.T. Price, 
Re~ntDevelopment, An Improper Extension ofCivil Litigation byIndigents: M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 
117 S. Ct. 555 (1996), 20 HAR.v.J.L.&PuB.POL'Y 905 (1997) (giving a detailed summary ofthe 
opinion); Jason T. Jacoby, Note, ML.B. v. S.LJ.: "Equal Justice"for Indigent Parents, 32 U. 
RlCH. L. REv. 571 (1998) (noting that the Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause apply 
in parental rights termination proceedings for indigents); Sundeep Kothari, Comment, And Justice 
for All: 171e Role Equal Protection and Due Process Principles Have Played in Providing 
Indigentl with Meaningful Access to the CoUJ'IS, 72 TUL. L. REv. 2159 (1998) (suggesting that 
a combination of due process and equal protection principles have driven the expansion of 
indigent rights). 
11. "Child custody decisionmaking" refers to decisions concerning which legalJyrecognized 
parent shall Jive with the child and which legally recognized parent shalJ visit with the child. The 
tenn does not refer to the means by which someone can be recognized as a legal parent. See, e.g., 
E.N.O. v. L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886 (Mass. 1999)(stating the probate court had equity jurisdiction 
to grant visitation between child and de facto parent), cert. denied 120 S.Ct. 500 (1999). Nor does 
the tennrefer to decisions related to custody orvisitation ofa child by grandparents or others who 
are not legally recognized as parents. Similarly, "child custody disputes" refers to disputes 
concerning which legally recognized parent shall live with the child and which legalJy recognized 
parent shall visit with the child. · 
-- --- --------- --- ----·-- -.. ........~~
--. 
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essentially the same as non-"stepparent adoptions; and (4) children's interests 
are often overlooked in the applicable analytical framework. This Essay 
challenges these assumptions. As close examination ofthe facts inML.B. will 
show, these assumptions are ill-fitted to the facts offamily situations in many 
instances. In fact, an examination of the relationship between the ML.B. 
decision and the aforementioned assumptionsindicates the need forsuggestions 
with a different focus. For instance, providing legal assistance for indigent 
parents in custody litigation, consideringopenadoption in stepparent adoptions, 
and paying more attention to the legal status ofchildren are ideas that may lead 
to the development of more nuanced, child-centered ways ofthinking about 
parental rights. 
Partnofthis Essay highlights pertinent aspects ofthe ML.B. decision and 
analyzes the doctrinal aspects ofthe decision. Part III discusses and questions 
key assumptions made in theML.B. decision and in contemporary family law 
and suggests other approaches that should be considered. 
II. 	 THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN ML.B. v. S.L.J. AND SUBSEQUENT 
CASE HISTORY 
AlthoughML.B. v. S.L.J. wasaterminationofparentalrightscase, it arose 
in the aftermath of a divorce and in conjunction with a remarriage and 
adoption. 12 M.L.B. and S.L.J. were married for almost eight years before 
divorcing in June 1992.13 They had one child born in April1985 and one child 
born in February 1987.14 Following the divorce, the children remained in their 
father' s custody, which was agreed upon at the time of the divorce.' 5 In 
September 1992, S.L.J., the children's father, remarried, and the children 
continued to live with him.16 InNovember 1993, S.L.J. and his new wife J .P.J. 
filed a petition to terminate M.L.B.'s parental rights17 and to allow for J.P.J.'s 
adoption of the children, who were six and eight years old at the time ofthe 
12. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 107 (1996). This ls a typical situation for a large 
proportion of adoptions. See MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMJUES AND THE LAW, 161·63 
(1994). 
13. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107. 
14. /d. 
15. /d. 
16. /d. 
17. Id. Under Mississippi law, an adoption petition can be filed by an unmanied person or 
a manied couple. MISS. Coo£ ANN. § 93-17-3 (1994 & Supp. 2000). A parent can voluntarily 
relinquish parental rights and consent to an adoption. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-15-103(2) (1994 & 
Supp. 2000). The parental rights ofone parent can be terminated without terminating the parental 
rights ofthe other parent. Miss . CODE ANN.§ 93-15-109 (1994 & Supp. 2000). 1fthe parental 
rights ofa parent have been terminated, the parent shall not be heard in the adoption proceeding. 
Mtss . CoDEANN. § 93-17-7 (Supp. ~000). 
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petition.18 Under the conventional system., the parental rights ofthe biological 
parents must be tenninated in order for an adoption to go forward.19 The 
petition alleged that M.L.B. had not exercised her visitation rights and still 
owed child support.20 M.L.B. counterclaimed, alleging that S.L.J. had not 
allowed her reasonable visitation in violationofthe divorce decree and seeking 
primazy custody of the cbildren.21 Prior to filing the counterclaim to the 
termination petition, M.L.B. had not asked the court to enforce the divorce 
decree to allow her visitation.22 
After a hearing, which took place on three separate days between the 
summer and fall of 1994, the Chancellor in December 1994 terminated 
M.L.B.'s parental rights, ordered the adoption by J.P.J., and ordered that the 
children's birth certificates show J.P.J. as their mother.23 This is standard 
Mississippiprocedure for adoptions24 as well as thestandardprocedure inother 
states.25 Mississippi law provides that parental rights may be terminated ''when 
there is [a] substantial erosion ofthe relationship between the parent and child 
which was caused at least in part by the parent's serious neglect, abuse, 
prolonged and unreasonable absence, unreasonable failure to visit or 
communicate, or prolonged imprisonment"26 
18. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107 {1996). SLJ. must consent to the adoption ofthe children by 
J.PJ. and himself; the adoption could then take effect immediately, assuming M.L.B.'s parental 
rights already had been terminated. The adoption decree may be entered immediately ifa child is 
the stepchild of a petitioner or is related by blood to the petitioner within the third degree or in 
some other circumstances. Miss. CoDE ANN.§ 93-17-13 (1994 & Supp. 2000). 
19. An adoption cannot take place if any parent whose parental rights have not been 
terminated objects. Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-17-7 {Supp. 2000). For a discussion of adoption 
prooeed'mgs requiring termination of parental rights see MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 163-64; 
MargarctM. Mahoney, OpenAdoption in Context: The Wisdom andEnforceabilityofVisitation 
OrderzforFormer Parents Under Uniform AdoptionAct§ 4-1I 3, 51 FLA.L.REv. 89, 92 {1999); 
and Philip S. Welt, Adoption and the Constitution: Are Adoptive Parents Really "Strangers 
Without Rights"? 1995 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 165, 174-77. As Mahoney notes, adoption by a 
stepparent generally takes place through the joint Petition ofthe stepparent and the biological 
parent to whom the stepparent is married. MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161-63. Even though a 
court tccbnically may temporarily terminate the parental rights of the biological parent who is 
married to the stepparent, the biological parent's rights are reestablished through the granting of 
the petition. The adoption by the stepparent will not affe.ct the legal or custodial relationship 
between the child and the biological parent who is married to the stepparent. MAHONEY, supra 
note 12, at 163-64. 
20. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107. 
21. /d. 
22. ML.B. v. S.W.• No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *6 (Miss. 
Ct. App. May 18, 1999); see infra notes 96-101. 
23. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107-08. 
24. See Miss. CODE ANN.§ 93-17-21 (1994) (detailing how to revise birth certificates). 
25. See Annette Ruth Appell, Blending Families Through Adoption: Implications for 
Collaborative Adoption Law andPractice, 15 B,U. L. REv. 997, 1007 n.40 (1995) (referencing 
methods ofrevising birth certificates in various states). 
26. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108 n.1 {citing Miss. CODEANN. § 93-15-103(3) {1994)).. 
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In the Chancellor's written order terminating M.L.B.' s parental rights and 
allowing the adoption, the Chancellor echoed the statutory language, stating 
that there had been a '"substantial erosion of the relationship between the 
natural mother ... and the minor children' which had been caused 'at least in 
partby [M.L.B. 's] serious neglect, abuse, prolonged and unreasonable absence 
or unreasonable failure to visit or communicate with her minor children. , 27 
The Chancellor further found that S.L.J. and J.P.J. had met their burden of 
proof by clear and convincing evidence28 in accordance with the required 
evidentiary standard.29 The Chancellor made a lengthy oral order from the 
bench, but because M.L.B. could not afford the transcript, she was not able to 
use the order in her initial appea1.30 
M.L.B. appealed and paid the $100 filing fee, but was not able to pay the 
$2352.36 transcript preparation fee.31 Mississippi law provides that "if the 
appellant 'intends to urge on appeal,' as M.L.B. did, 'that a finding or 
conclusion is unsupported by the evidence or is contrary to the evidence"' the 
appellant must order and pay for the relevant parts of the transcript.32 The 
guardian ad litem, who was appointed in accordance with Mississippi law to 
protect the children's interests in this matter/3 did not appeal the Chancellor's 
decision?• The Mississippi Supreme Court denied M.L.B. 's application to 
27. Jd. at 107-08. Justice Ginsburg noted the brevity of the lower court's order that was 
available to the Supreme Court: "Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, 
however, or otherwise reveals precisely why M.L.B. was decreed, forevennore, a stranger to her 
children." Jd. at 108; see infra note 30. 
28. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 108. 
29. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769 (1982) (holding thot decisions tenninating 
parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence). 
30. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 108·09. The Mississippi Appeals Court decision following the 
United States Supreme Court decision sets forth in full the Chancellor's fact-finding and decision. 
M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA·00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXJS 299, at •5-28 (Miss. Ct. App. 
May 18, 1999). 
31. MLB., 519 U.S. at 108·09. 
32. !d. Mississippi law states a party can make a motion for fmdings offact and conclusions 
of Jaw after a court has issued its decision, and ifa party makes such a motion, the court must 
issue fmdings andconclusions. Mlss.R. Crv.P. 52. However, the court's fmdings and conclusions 
need not be in writing. Conversation with John McDuff, Esq. (January 21, 2000). It is not clear 
whether M.L.B. made such a motion after reviewing the Chancellor's brief decision. Efforts to 
reach ML.B.'s counsel were unsuccessful. Even if she had made such a motion, the court's 
findings might have been oral. and thus a transcript would have been necessary to review them. 
In any event, the Chancellor did issue a lengthy oral order. See supra note 30. 
33. MISS. CODE ANN. § 93·15·1 07(1) (Supp. 2000) (requiring appointment ofa guardion 
ad litem "to protect the interest ofthe child in the tennination of parental rights" proceedings). 
There is tremendous variation betweenstates concerning representation ofchildren in termination 
ofparental rights proceedings and child protective proceedings generally. SeeJEANKOHPETER.S, 
REPRESENTING C HILDREN IN CHILD PROlECTIVE PROCEEDINGS: E1li1CAL AND PRACTICAL 
DIMENSIONS§ 2·3(b), at24-33, app. B, at255-477 {1997). 
34. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 95-853, 1996 WL 587663, at •23, •29 {1996) (transcriptoforol 
lirgwnent before the United States Supreme Court). · 
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proceed inform a pauperis, and, th~M.L.B. could not pursue her appeal as the 
state would not pay for the transcript3s 
The issue before the Supreme Court was whether "a State, consistent with 
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses ofthe Fourteenth Amendment, 
[may) condition appeals from trial court decrees terminating parental rights on 
the affected parent's ability to pay record preparation fees."36 In resolving this 
issue, Justice Ginsburg analyzed the nature ofthe decrees terminating parental 
rights.37 
In analyzing the issue of whether the state had to pay for M.L.B's 
transcript, Justice Ginsburg highlighted the "narrow category ofcivil cases in 
which the State must provide access to its judicial processes without regard to 
a party's ability to pay court fees."38 She noted that cases "involving state 
controls or intrusions on family relationships" are treated differently from other 
civil cases.39 In such contexts, "to guard against undue official intrusion, the 
Court bas examined closely and contextually the importance of the 
governmental interest advanced in defense ofthe intrusion. "40 Justice Ginsburg 
thus referred to the equation as "government interest'' versus "family 
relationship." 
Justice Ginsburg also cited two criminal cases as precedent Griffin v. 
Rlinoi:l1 and Mayer v. Chicago42 require that a state providing an appeal from 
criminal convictions, including misdemeanor convictions, cannot bar indigents 
from the appeal process.43 Justice Ginsburg, characterizing Mayer, stated that 
"[a]n impectmious party ... whether found guilty ofa felony or conduct only 
35. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 109. The Mississippi Supreme Court's decision denying her 
application to proceed in forma pauperis was unreported. Petitioner's Brief at *1, M.L.B. v. 
S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), available at 1996 WL 291022. At least thirty-one 
states provided transcripts for parental rights tenninat:ion appeals. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 122 n.l3. 
According to the petitioner, only Mississippi took the position that in forma pauperis appeals 
were not allowed in civil cases. Petitioner's Brief at *26-27, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102 
( 1996) (No. 95-853), available at 1996 WL 291022. 
36. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107. 
37. /d. at 113-19.lhesearecivil casesanddonotinvolvethethreatofincarceration oreven 
a fine./d. 
38. /d. at113. Filing fees in civil cases genenilly do not raise due process implications.Jd. 
at 1l.J-16. 
39. /d. at 116; 3ee also Boddie v. Connecticut. 401 U.S. 371,374 (1971) (holding that it 
was a due process violation for the state to deny a divorce to a manied couple based on their 
inability to pay court costs because oftheir fundamental interest at stake in the marriage and the 
''state monopolization ofthe means for legally dissolving this relationshipj. 
40. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted). 
41. 351 U.S. 12 {1956) (overturning an Illinois rule that required aU indigent defendants 
except those sentenced to death to pay for a transcript in order to appeal their convictions). 
42. 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (extending the Griffin rule to misdemeanor defendants). 

· 43. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 110-12. 
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'quasi criminal innatme' 'cannot be denied a record ofsufficient completeness 
to permit proper [appellate] consideration ofhis claims."*' 
Expanding on the constitutional protections for families, she restated the 
principle that "[c]hoices about marriage, family life, and the upbringing of 
children are among associa1ional rights this Court has ranked as 'of basic 
importance in our society,' rights sheltered by the Fourteenth Amendment 
against the State's unwarranted usurpation, disregard, or disrespect.'145 She 
cited familiar precedents regarding marriage,46 procreation,•7 and raising 
children.•8 She characterized M.L.B. 's case as "involving the State's authority 
to sever permanently a parent-child bond'149 and stated that the Court 
approached the case "mindful of the gravity of the sanction imposed on 
[M.L.B.] and in light of two prior decisions most immediately in point,"50 
referencing the due process precedents of Lassiter v. Department ofSocial 
Servicer1 and Santos/cy v. Kramer.51 
In a footnote, Justice Ginsburg remarked that though "the termination 
proceeding . . . was initiated by private parties as a prelude to an adoption 
petition, rather than by a state agency, the challenged state action remains 
essentially the same: M.L.B. resists the imposition of an official decree 
extinguishing, as no power other than the State can, her parent-child 
relationships."53 To Ginsburg, the dilemma is simply governmental interest 
versus family relationship, despite the private origins of the issue in a 
breakdown of a marriage. 
Justice Ginsburg then highlighted aspects ofLassiter and Santos/cy which 
emphasize the importance of the parents' interests over the state's interest. 
Although Lassiter held that indigent parents did not have an automatic right to 
counsel in cases involving termination ofparental rights, s.. it emphasized the 
importance of parents' interests in companionship with and custody oftheir 
children.55 A decision terminating parental rights mwork[s] a unique kind of 
deprivation.' For that reason, '[a] parent's interest in the accuracy and justice 
of the decision . • • is • . . a commanding one. "'56 The Court in Santosley 
44. ld. at 112 (citing Mayer, 404 U.S. at 196, 198). 
45 . Jd. at 116 (citation omitted). 
46. /d. (citing Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 
0978), and Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)). 
47. /d. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)). 
48. lei. (citing Pierce v. Soc'y ofSisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) and Meyerv. Nebraska, 262 
u.s. 390 (1923)). 
49. M.LB., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996) (footnote omitted). 

so. lei. at 117. 

51. 452 u.s. 18 0981). 
52. 455 u.s. 745 (1982). 
53. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 n.8. 
54. lei. at 117 (citing lAssiter, 452 U.S. at 31-32). 
55. /d. at 117-18 (citing .Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27). 
56. Jd. at 118 (quoting lassiter, 452 U.S. at27). 
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characterized the parents' interests as "far more precious than any property 
right."S7 
Having laid the foundation, Justice Ginsburg turned to the issue ofhow to 
classify M.L.B.'s situation. The situation could either be categorized as a 
general civil case, in which the indigent would have no right to proceed without 
fees, or itcould be in the free-transcript category ofMayer v. City ofChicago58 
because the "accusatory state action [M.L.B.] is trying to fend off is barely 
distinguishable from criminal condemnation in view of the magnitude and 
57. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982). Santosky articulated general 
agreement (even from the dissenters) that ''the interest ofparents in their relationship with their 
children is sufficiently fundamental to come within the finite class ofliberty interests protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id at 774 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting), quotedin M.L.B., 519 U.S. 
at 119. InM.L.B. Justice Ginsburg also referred to a distinction between ''the State's termination 
ofa fully existing parent-child relationship., and ''the State's imposition ofthe legal obligations 
attending a biological relationship between parent and child." ML.B., 519 U.S. at 118 n.ll. A 
later case held that paternity cases could be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. See 
Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 575 (1987). For discussion of the issues of paternity and 
developing parent-child relationships, see generally Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998) 
(upholding statutory distinctions in citizenship requirements for children hom out ofwedlock in 
foreign lands which treat children ofan alien father and citizen mother different from those ofan 
alien JDGther and citizen father); Lehrv. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248,267-68 (1983) (holding a state 
may aooonl different rights to parents if"one parent has an established custodial relationship with 
the child and the other parent has either abandoned or never established a relationship" with the 
child (feotnote omitted)); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 382,394 (1979) (holding a New 
York adoption law unconstitutional as it distinguished between the rights ofunwed mothers and 
unwed fathers by providing for the adoption ofan illegitimate child solely by the consent ofthe 
mother); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978) (upholding the constitutionality of 
Georgiaadoption laws denying an unwed father the power to prevent the adoption ofhis child and 
the state's recognition ofthe "difference in the extent ofcommitmentto the welfare ofthe child" 
of an un\Wd father compared to a married father); and Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 658 
(1972) (holding "parents are constitutionally entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their 
children areremoved from their custody"). For consideration ofproblemswiththe child protective 
system, see generally Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, 
Race, and Class in the Child Protection System: An Essay, 48 S.C. L. REv. 577 (1997) (arguing 
children's needs are often not met by the various child protective systems); and Amy Sinden, 
"Why Won 't Mom Cooperate?" A Critique ofInformality in Child Welfare Proceedings, 11 
YALEJ.L.&FEMINISM 339 {1999) (highlighting various problems in child welfare proceedings). 
. S8. 404 U.S. 189 (1971). . 
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permanenceofthe loss she faces.''59 Justice Ginsburg placed M.L.B.'s situation 
in the latter category. 60 
Indiscussing the doctrinal foundations ofGriffin v. Illinois,61 Mayer v. City 
ofChicago,61 and related cases, Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that both due 
process and equal protection concerns were present and that in the Griffin line 
ofcases,'" [ d]ueprocess and equalprotection principles converge. "'63 ML.B.'s 
59. M..L.B., 519 U.S. at 119 (citation and footnote omitted). Justice Ginsburg's language in 
that sentence and throughout the opinion is laden with emotion; Justice Ginsburg then asks how 
much process is due before the state forever''brand[s] (her]unfit for affiliation with her children." 
/d. at 119. ''Nothing in the Chancellor's order describes the evidence, however, or otherwise 
reveals precisely why M.L.B. was decreed, forevermore, a stranger to her children." /d. at 108. 
Justice Ginsburg refers to the lower court's decision as a "stem judgment." /d. al 122. M.L.B. is 
..endeavoring to defend against the State's destruction ofher family bonds, and to resistthe brand 
associated with a parental unfitness adjudication." /d. at 125. As the majority opinion's 
emotionally laden language may imply a particularly strong, gender-based bond between mothers 
and their children, it is interesting to consider whether the decision would have come out 
differently had MLB. been aman trying to stop the adoption ofhis children by his ex-wife's new 
husband, rather than a woman trying to stop the adoption of her children by her ex-husband's new 
wife. On the other hand, the rights of fathers to parent children born to their wives are deeply 
embedded in traditional family law. See generally Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 
(1989) (plurality opinion) (noting a husband has Uberty interest in raising child born to his wife, 
although child is probably not biologically related to husband). Therefore, as the children were 
bom "in wedlock," a hypothetical male would have the force ofthis tradition behind him. Even 
more interesting is whether the decision would have come out differently had M.L.B. been a man 
who had never nwried the mother ofthe children and who was trying to stop their adoption by 
his ex-girlfriend's new husband. The Supreme Court's precedents in this area have "protected the 
rights ofunwed fathers when they have lived with or established a substantial relationship with 
their children, unless the unwed father is asserting rights against an 'intact' family... Naomi R. 
Cahn, Models ofFamily Privacy, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1225, 1237 (1999) (footnote omitted). 
See generally, Laurence C. Nolan, "Unwed Children" and Their Parents Before the Unlled 
Stales Supreme Court from Levy to Michael H: Unlikely Participants In Constitutional 
Jurisprudence, 28 CAP. U. L. REv. 1 (1999} (explaining that unwed fathers do have a liberty 
interest in parent-child relationships). for an unwed father who had treated his visitation the way 
ML.B. may have, see text accompanying notes 105-13, it is possible that the Court would not 
have been so sensitive to the meaning and consequences ofterminating his parental rights. This 
possibility is supported by the fact that a plurality of the Court recently upheld an additionnl 
proof-of-paternity requirement for citizenship when the citizen parent ofa child who is born out­
of-wedlock and abroad is the child's father, as opposed to the child's mother, against an equal 
protection challenge. Miller v. Albright, 523 U.S. 420, 424 (1998). 
60. The Court indicated that it was "[g]uided by Lassiter and Santosky, and other decisions 
acknowledging the primacy ofthe parent-child relationship .•.•" M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120. The 
additional cases "acknowledging the primacy of the parent-child relationship" were Stanley v. 
illinois, 405 U.S. 645,651 (1972} andMeyerv. Nebraslw, 262 U.S. 390,399 (1923). M..L.B., 519 
U.S. at 120. 
61. 351 u.s. 12 (1956). 
62. 404 u.s. 189 {1971). 
63. M..L.B., 519 U.S. at 120 (quotingBeardenv. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665 (1983)). Justice 
Ginsburg noted, "Tile equal protection concern relates to the legitimacy offencing out would-be 
appellants based solely on their inability to pay core costs. The due process concern homes in on 
the essential fairness of the state ..ordered proceedings anterior to adverse stale action." Jd. 
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claim "heavily" rested on an equal protection framework "for ... due process 
does not independently require that the State provide a right to appeal.'~ 
Without explicitly stating that there is no due process basis for the decision, 
Justice Ginsburg sta~ "We place this case within the framework established 
by our past decisions in this area. In line with those decisions, we inspect the 
character and intensity ofthe individual interest at stake, on the one hand, and 
the State's justification for its exaction, on the other."6S Again, the parent's 
individual interest is paired against the State's exaction. 
ML.B.'s individual interests were significant.66 She faced "forced 
dissolution of her parental rights. •»67 The loss of parental rights would be 
permanent: "In contrast to loss of custody, which does not sever the parent­
child bond, parental status termination is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ve]' ofthe 
most fundamental family relationship.'~ Further, ''the risk of error ... is 
considerable.•t69 
Turning from M.L.B.'s interest, the majority considered the state's 
'~ustification for its exaction."70 The only interest of the state that was 
considered was its financial interest in "offsetting the costs of its court 
system."71 Justice Ginsburg found that "in the tightly circumscribed category 
ofparental status termination cases, appeals are few, and not likely to impose 
an undue burden on the State."n Although state civil fees, such as filing fe~ 
generally are examined only for rationality, there are two exceptions: fees 
involvingthe rightto participate in political processes, and fees limiting access 
to judicial processes in cases "criminal or 'quasi criminal in nature. , 73 Justice 
Ginsburg placed termination of parental rights decrees in the quasi criminal 
(citations omitted). She further noted, "A 'precise rationale' has not been composed because cases 
ofthis order 'cannot be resolved by resort to easy slogans orpigeonhole analysis."' !d. (citations 
omitted). 
64. Jd. (citation omitted). 
65. ld. at 120-21 (citation o_mitted). 
66. M.L.B.'s interests were as strong as those ofthe "'impecunious medical student»• in 
Mayu. Id. at 121 (quoting Mayer, 404 U.S. at 197). Justice Ginsburg noted that in Mayer the 
student did not face jail, but ''the conviction .•. could affect his professional prospects and, 
possibly, even bar him from the practice ofmedicine." /d. (citingMayer, 404 U.S. at 197). Justice 
Ginsburg further noted in Mayer that the state's ''pocketbook interest in advance payment for a 
transcript •.. was tmimpressive when measured against the stakes for the defendanL" Jd. (citing 
Mayu, 404 U.S. atl97). 
67. Id. 
68. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Santos/cy, 455 U.S. at 753). 
69. M.LB., 519 U.S. at 121. Justice Ginsburg noted that "of the eight reported appellate 
challenges to Mississippi trial court termination orders from 1980 through May 1996, three were 
reverled by the Mississippi Supreme Court for failure to meet the 'clear and convincing' proof 
standard." Id. at 109 n.3. 
70. See id. at 122-24. 
71. /d. atl22. 
72. /d. (citations omitted). 
73. ld. at 124 (quoting Mayer v. City ofChicago, 404 U.S. 189; 196 (1971)). 
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category, namely 'the categocy where the State cannot '"bolt the door to equal 
justice."'74 Even though the fee requirement may have been rational, the 
financial justification was unimpressive when measured against the rights at 
stake for M.L.B.75 
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision, the Mississippi 
Supreme Court reinstated M.L.B.'s appeal, required that she be allowed to 
proceed without fees, and ordered that the record in the case be transcribed.76 
Based on a detailed review of the Chancellor's trial level decision, the 
Mississippi Court ofAppeals on remand held that M.L.B. 's parental rights had 
been improperly terminated." According to that court, under Mississippi law 
S.L.J. must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence thatM.L.B. actually 
had abandoned her children, and as the evidence did not prove abandonment, 
her parental rights should not have been tenninated.78 This conclusion was 
upheld by the Mississippi Supreme Court in April 2000.79 Thus, almost six 
years after M.L.B. 's parental rights had been terminated, her rights were 
reinstated so that she could have visitation with her children. 
III. DISCUSSION 
Four aspects ofthe Supreme Court's decision are particularly significant. 
One is the distinction the court makes between judicial decisions concerning 
termination ofparental rights and judicial decisions concerning child custody. 80 
Second is the framework applied to the situation, which assumes that the 
concept ofa "risk oferror'' is meaningful and that adversarial decisionmaking 
74. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 124 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 24 (1955) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
15. In his dissent, Justice Thomaswarned that the decision would result in "greaterdemands 
on the States to provide free assistance to would-be appellants in all manner of civil cases 
involving interests that cannot, based.on the test established by the majority, be distinguished from 
the admittedly important interest at issue here." /d. at 130. Justice Thomas pointed out that it was 
not clear whether the decision rested only on equal protection orhad due process aspects, and he 
asserted that ifneither clause provided the basis for the free transcript, a combination ofthe two 
clauses did not either. /d. He characterized the decision as dealing with ''the new-found 
constitutional right to free transcripts in civil appeals." /d. at 129. 
76. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *3 (Miss. 
Ct. App. May 18, 1999). 
77. /d. at *40. 
78. See id. at *40. Although the Chancellor had found that there bad been "substantial 
erosion" in the relationship, which was one ofthe requirements for tenninating parental rights, 
he did not also conclude that her actions constituted "abandonment," as required by Mississippi 
law; moreover, the facts that the Chancellor found did not constitute "abandonment." Jd. at *29, 
40. See infra text accompanying notes 110-13. 
79. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CI'-00929-SCT, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 93, at *1·2 (April20, 
2000). 
80. See M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996); infraPartill.A. See generallysupra 
note '11 (defining "child custody decisionmaking"). · 
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is the best way to reach accurate and fair results. 81 Third is the lack of 
distinction between stepparent adoptions and other adoptions. 82 Fourth is the 
exclusion of the interests of children from the framework.83 Each will be 
discussed below. 
A. 	 The Distinction Between Decisions Concerning Child Custody and 
Termination ofParental Rights: For Indigent Parents, Often the 
Difference Between the Two is Not Very Great 
The majority opinion inML.B. sharply distinguishes between adjudication 
of child custody disputes between parents and termination of parental rights 
adjudication.... The state's role in these two situations, by implication, is also 
significantly different. Justice Ginsburg noted that "[i]n contrast to loss of 
custody, which does not sever the parent-child bond, parental status termination 
is 'irretrievabl[y] destructi[ ve ]' ofthe most fundamental family relationship."85 
Family law enumerates various differences as well. Decisions terminating 
parental rights must be based on clear and convincing evidence, 86 while 
parents' disputes over child custody, like other civil cases, are decided based 
on a preponderance ofthe evidence. 87 There is no right to counsel for parents 
in custody cases, yet there is a right to counsel for parents in many tennination 
ofparental rights cases.81 Child custody orders are modifiable,89 while orders 
for the termination ofparental rights are not.90 However, as explained below, 
the two situations are not necessarily different with respect to the impact of 
custody orders on indigent parents. 
Justice Ginsburg noted that unlike tennination orders, custody orders are 
''matters modifiable at the parties' will or based on changed circumstances,"91 
and indeed, custody orders can be modified in those instances.92 However, this 
81. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 120-21; infra Partill.B. 
82. See M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 116 n.8; infra Part ill.C.. 
83. See infra Part m.D. 
84. See M.LB., 519 U.S. at 121, 127-28. 
85. /d. at 121 (quoting Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982) (alteration in 
original)). 
86. Santoskyv. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745,747-48 (1982)(decisions tenninatingparental rights 
must be based on clear and convincing evidence). 
87. See, e.g., Lipsey v. Lipsey, 755 So. 2d 564, 565 {Miss. Ct. App. 2000) (stating that the 
moving party in an action to modify custody must prove its case by a preponderance of the 
evidence). 
88. Lassiter v. Dept ofSoc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981) (deciding the rigbtto counsel 
in tennination ofparental rights cases depends on character and complexity ofcase). 
89. See 2 HOMERH. CLARK, JR.,THELAWOFDoMESTICRELATIONS IN1HEUNITEDSTATES 
§ 20.9, at 547 (Practitioner's ed., 2d. ed. 1987). 
90. See id. § 21.2, at 572. 
91. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 127-28 (1996). 
92. CLARK, supra note 89, § 20.9, at 547. 
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distinction may notoe as great as it seems. In fact, ifone parent loses custody 
to the other parent in a child custody dispute, it is unlikely that the custody 
order will ever be modified "at the parties' will," since the winner will be 
unlikely to agree to modify it Further, a court's ability to modify custody 
decisions is more theoretical than real, particularly when people cannot afford 
counsel.93 Moreover, when people cannot afford counsel, enforcement of 
custody decisions through contempt or other means is often impossible.94 By 
the time a termination ofparental rights proceeding is brought and the indigent 
parent obtains court-appointed counsel in the termination proceeding,95 the 
relationship between the parent and child may already be damaged or 
destroyed. 
Scrutiny of the facts of ML.B. raises questions along these lines. 
According to the Supreme Court's opinion, the father's custody ofthe children 
was decided by agreement between the parties upon divorce.96 The children 
93. People oflow and moderate income levels have difficulty obtaining attorneys for civil 
matters. See generally ROY W. REEsE & CAROLYN A. ELDRED,. R:EPORTONTHELEGAL NEEDS 
AMONGLoW-INCOMEANDMODERAlE-INCOMEHOUSatOLDS: SUMMARYOFFINDINGSFROMTHE 
COMPREHENSIVELEGALNEEDS STIJDY (1994), reprinted in FINDINGS OF THE COMPREHENSIVE 
LEGALNEEDS STIJDY 41-44 (AMERICANBARAsSOCIATION 1994) (finding low-income families 
are less likely to seek counsel than moderate-income families and noting "a feeling that nothing 
could be done" was ''most frequently cited in low-income situations"). Attorneys generally refuse 
to represent parties in a divorce without a substantial upfront retainer. CLARK, supra note 89, 
§ 17.2, at 234. This retainer requirement of course would be applied to persons seeking 
modifications of divorce decrees. Although domestic relations statutes often provide for fee­
shifting based on the financial capabilities ofthe litigants; CLARK, supra note 89, § 17.2, at233, 
fee-shifting is unwieldy in practice and often does not ensure that the poorer spouse (usually the 
woman) receives competent representation. See Linda J. Ravdin & Kelly J. Capps, Alternative 
Pricing of Legal Services in a Domestic Relations Practice: Choices and Ethical 
Considerations, 33 FAM. L.Q. 387, 409{1999); see also Melody Kay Fuller, Unbundling Family 
Law Practice Creates Pro Bono Opportunities, COLO. LAW., Sept 1998, at 29, 30 (noting a 
shortage of pro bono attorneys to represent parties in family law cases); Jeannette F. Swent, 
Gender Bias at the Heart ofJustice: ,An Empirical Study ofState Task Forces, 6 S. CAL. R.Bv. 
L. & WoMEN's STUD. 1, 58·59 (1996) (summarizing findings ofgender bias studies that women 
have particular difficulty finding attorneys in divorce because oflack offunds); Rosalie R.Young, 
The SearchforCounse/: Perception ofApplicantsforSubsidizedLega/Assistance,36 BRANDEIS 
J. FAM. L. 551, 551-60, 572-74 {1998) {describing experiences ofindigent people who cannot 
obtain attorneys and describing the particular need ofwomen for counsel in divorce and other 
family cases). 
94. See sources cited supra note 93. 
95. Despite the court's limited requirement for counsel in tennination of parental rights 
proceedings in Lassiter v. Department ofSocial Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981), state legislatures 
have "continued to expand the statutory right to counsel" in such proceedings. Rosalie R. Young, 
The Right to Appointed Counsel in Termination ofParental Rights Proceedings: The States' 
Response to Lassiter, 14 ToURo L. REv. 247, 273-274 (1997). 
96. ML.B., 519 U.S. at 107. There is no infonnation in the Court's opinion about why the 
father had custody upon divorce or details ofthe circumstances ofthe agreement. The subsequent 
Mississippi Court of Appeals' decision reveals that the divorce decree forbade M.L.B. from 
exercising her visitation in the presence of J.B., who was her husband at the time of the 
Chaneellor's decision. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, 
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lived with their father for almost a year and a half before the petition to 
terminate was filed.97 The petition claimed that ML.B. had not maintained 
reasonable visitation.91 However, once the petition was filed and M.L.B. 
obtained a court-appointed lawyer in the termination case, she counterclaimed 
for full custody and alleged that the father bad notprovidedherwith reasonable 
visitation as provided in the divorce decree.99 
But prior to her counterclaim to the termination petition, M.L.B. had not 
taken steps to modify or enforce the judgment that she, in theory, could have 
obtained under Mississippi law. For example, she could have filed a motion to 
change the terms of the divorce judgment so that she would get more or 
different visitation rights.100 Alternatively, she could have filed a motion for 
contempt or enforcement of the judgment alleging that she was being denied 
visitation.101 
There is no way ofknowing from any ofthe opinions exactly why M.L.B. 
did not take advantage of any of these options during the year and a half 
between the divorce judgment and the filing of the termination petition. 
However, some clues may be gleaned from the Chancellor's opinion. First, 
M.L.B., who had an eleventh grade education, worked various jobs during this 
period.102 After an eight year marriage, she received only an automobile and 
two quilts from the divorce.103 It is reasonable to infer that herjobs during this 
period did not pay high wages and that she did not have funds to hire a lawyer 
to try to enforce or modify the custody order during this period.104 Second, 
M.L.B. and her new husband had significant problems which may have 
interfered with her efforts to visit or to enforce the visitation provisions ofthe 
divoroe decree. The parties were divorced in June 1992, and M.L.B. married 
J.B., her boyfriend prior to the divorce,1os in October 1992.106 At some 
at •6. &e infra notes 104-09. 
97. M.L.B., 519 U.S. 11107. 
98. ld. . 
99. /d. 
100. See Miss. CODEANN.§ 93-5-23 (1994 & Supp. 2000)(allowing the court on petition, 
after issuing a custody decision, to change the decree and make such new decrees as the case may 
require). 
101. See MISS. CooEANN. § 93-5-81 (1991) (giving the chancery court power to punish 
violations ofits orders through contempt proceedings). Contempt proceedings have been used to 
enforce visitation orders. See, e.g., Saunders v. Saunders, 724 So. 2d 1132, 1135-36 (Miss. Ct. 
App. 1998) (upholding lower court's determination thatex-wife was incontemptofcourt's order 
on visitation). 
102. M.L.B. v. S.W.. No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. App. LEXlS 299, at •16, 20 
(Miss. Ct. App. May 18, 1999).Herplaces ofemployment included Timber Craft, Witbank's Bar­
B-Que, Rest Haven and Ripley Manor./d. at •t7. She is now a certified nurse assistant/d. 
103. /d. 
104. See Cl.ARK, supra note 89, § 17.2, at 233-34. 
105. M .L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at •7. 
106. /d. at *6, 20. S.LJ. remarried in September 1992. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107. 
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unspecified time, J.B. was convicted ofan assault on a police officer and had 
spent time injail. 107 After he physically and emotionallyabusedM.L.B., she left 
him for about a year.108 Thus, during the year and a half between the divorce 
(June 1992) and when the petition was filed (November 1993), she married a 
man who abused her and then left him. 109 When the petition was filed, she was 
apparently separated from him. 
There are factual disputes concerning M.L.B.'s visitation and attempts at 
visitation during this period. ML.B. claimed that S.L.J. hung up the phone on 
her when she tried to speak with her children.110 S.L.J. claimedthatM.L.B. did 
not frequently visitm-at times he did not know where she was112-and that 
she hung up the phone when he called.113 It is possible that M.L.B. could have 
had more visitation during this period, but it is impossible to know whether 
M.L.B. would have taken the necessary steps to enforce or change the divorce 
judgment had she had ready access to an attorney. There is no way to know for 
certain whether the counterclaim inthe parental rights case seeking full custody 
was made in order to try to strengthen her strategic position, 114 or for some 
other reason. 11s 
107. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *17. 
108. ld. at *20. ML.B.leftJ.B. between roughly June 1993 and July 1994. /d. 
109. The petition was filed in November 1993. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107. 
110. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *19. According to the Chancellor, M.L.B. 
testified that the last time she had the children with her was October 15, 1993, which was over 
a year before the final hearing prior to the tennination.ld. at *17-18. M.L.B. visited the children 
at her sister's house in the fall of1994 and on other occasions when the children were staying at 
her sister's bouse.ld. at *16-18. M.L.B.'s sister testified that M.L.B. tried to see her children, 
bought gifts for them, and that sometimes the children called M.L.B.Id. at *16. M.L.B. testified 
that S.L.J. would not allow her to deliver gifts for the children. ld. at *17. M.L.B. testified that 
S.U. ''would not allow her visitation," and so she stopped paying child support. I d. at *19. S.L.J. 
testified that the last time he believedM.L.B. saw the children was in early August 1994, attheir 
aunt's bouse.ld. at *9.S.L.J. teStified he dropped the children offwith their aunt (M.L.B.'s sister) 
so they could visit with their mother, but that M.L.B. had come by only one time and stayed for 
about thirty minutes.ld. at *10. S.L.J. also stated that at one point after the divorce he left the 
children for a week with M.L.B.'s sister so that M.L.B. could visit with them but that M.L.B. 
"only visited about twice during that week." Jd. at *11, 21. This testimony ofS.L.J. isnot clearly 
rebutted in the Chancellor's summary ofM.L.B.'s or her sister's testimony./d. at *22-28.11 is 
difficult to tell from the Chancellor's opinion bowmuch visitation was attempted and bowmuch 
visitation actually took plac:e.ld. 
111. Jd. at •s. 
112. ld. at •s. 
113. ld. at •t9. 
114. A possible strategic reason for the counterclaim is the possibility that a judge would 
be less likely to terminate her parental rights ifshe claimed she actually wanted full custody and 
not just visitation . 
liS. After the counterclaim was filed, M.L.B.'s position changed. At the Chancellor's 
hearing, M.L.B. testified that she was only seeking visitation, not custody. M.L.B., 1999 Miss. 
· App. LEXIS 299, at *20-21. See infra note 158. · 
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In a practical sense, for the indigent parent losing custody, a judgment of 
custody for the other parent is not always ver:y different from a judgment 
tenninating parental rights. While the court orders are theoretically modifiable, 
without the assistance of counsel they may in practice be almost final 
adjudications of parental rights. Similarly, while orders are theoretically 
enforceable by contempt or other means, retaining counsel to handle such a 
fact-intensive, time-consuming matter is likely to be extremely difficult if a 
litigant lacks substantial funds. 116 When a termination petition eventually is 
filed and counsel is appointed by the court for an indigent parent, the 
relationship between that parent and the child may already be thoroughly 
undermined. Thus, the state's role in the two contexts may be viewed as more 
similar than different 
The state's role in deciding custody disputes between parents is certainly 
not minor or incidental. As in termination of parental rights cases, it is 
tremendously consequential. Ifthe fundamental reason for the free transcript 
requirementofML.B. is that the challenged state action deeply affects parental 
rights, logically there should be similar requirements incustody cases and other 
family law cases.117 In his dissent, Justice Thomas makes the same point with 
alarm.u• Although the extension of ML.B. and Lassiter v. Department of 
Social Servic~119 to child custody cases involving indigent parents is unlikely, 
nonetheless, as noted above, strong arguments exist for such an extension.120 
116. See supra no~ 93. 
117. The same argument applies to the court•s counsel requirement of Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18 (1981). Custody issues cannot be clearly separated 
from visitation issues, as the flip side ofacustody order often is the section pertaining to visitation 
for the non-custodial parent The plurality and concurrences in Troxel v. Granville show that 
certain visitation orders can be unconstitutional, although the decision does not specify the exact 
circwnJtanoes where such orders will be unconstitutional. See supra no~ 9. See also Palmore v. 
Sidoti, ~66 U.S. 429, 433-34 (1984) (holding that a custody decision based in part on race was 
an unooostitutional denial ofequal pro~ction). Since the Troxel pluraJity•s decision was narrow 
and the ooncUil'eD.ces were splintered, the exact significance of the holding is debatable. But 
Troul oertainly does not say the custody or visitation orders are constitutionally equivalent to 
~nnination ofparental rights orders. 
118. In his dissent, Justice Thomas claims the principles underlying the m&jority'sdecision 
do not necessarily limit it to the oon~xt of~nnination ofparental rights, but could be extended 
to other contexts such as transcripts for custody appeals. M.L.B. v . S.W ., 519 U.S. 102, 142 
(1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
119. 452 u.s. 18 (1981). 
120. Some policy arguments wouJd call for a re~tion ofthe current system. One argument 
is that broadened access to lawyers may breed more destructive litigation. However, under the 
current system, the party with the most funds has the most access to lawyers and thus the grea~r 
opportunity to engage in destructive litigation, which is highly problematic. Some also may argue 
that in a world of fini~ resources and massive child poverty, using public resources to enable 
parents to engage in custody battles at the government' s expense is not a wise use of these 
l'C80Uroes. However, one could respond that the current situation is untenable and that resources 
· are not 10 scarce. 
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B. Risk ofE"or and the Advocacy System 
This section will discuss and question two assumptions found in the 
Supreme Court's decision in ML.B. and in its other termination of parental 
rights decisions. 121 First is the idea that "risk of error"122 is a meaningful 
concept in the context ofparental rights terminations. Second is the idea that 
the advocacy system, the "equal contest of opposed interests,"123 is the bestway 
to resolve disputes in this arena. 
The termination of parental rights in ML.B. and other opinions124 is 
governed by the due process framework established in Mathews v. Eldridge.125 
A balancing test is used to evaluate whether the state's process for terminating 
individual interests is sufficient to support the Court's decision.126 The Court 
must balance the individual's interest, the risk oferroneous deprivation ofthat 
interest, and the state' s interest.127 Justice Ginsburg notes in ML.B. the "risk of 
error ... is considerable" in the context oftermination ofparental rights. 128 This 
statement assumes that there is a correct outcome and an incorrect outcome in 
parental rights termination cases and that the appeal process determines 
whether the trial outcome was correct 
The idea ofrisk oferror in parental rights termination cases ties in with 
basic ideas about our adversary system, as articulatedinLassiterv. Department 
of Social Services. 129 The Lassiter Court stated "[O]ur adversary system 
presupposes [that] accurate and just results are most likely to be obtained 
through the equal contest ofopposed interests. "130 This statement presupposes 
that accurate results can be reached in all areas of the law, including 
termination of parental rights as in the context of Lassiter. It further 
121. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); Lassiter, 452 U.S. 18. 
122. "Risk oferror'' is a phrase used by Justice Ginsburg in the M.L.B. decision. M.L.B., 
519 U.S. at 121. 
123. "Equal contest ofopposed interests" is a phrase used by Justice Stewart in Lassiter. 
See Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 28. · 
124. See, e.g., Santosky, 455 U.S. 745; Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 452 U.S. 18 
(examining the right ofindigents to receive appointment ofcounsel in tennination proceedings). 
125. 424 U.S. 319,334-35 (1976) (identifying three factors to be considered in determining 
whether administrative procedures are constitutionally sufficient: the private interest affected by 
the offical action, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest, and the government's 
interest);seeSantosky,455 U.S. at 754-70 (applying the Mathews framework); Lassiter,452U.S. 
at 27-31 {referencing the Mathews framework) . 
126. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335. 
127. ld 
128. M.L.B. v. S.LJ., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1996). This is based on the fact that three out of 
eight parental termination cases appealed in Mississippi between 1980 and 1996 were reversed 
on appeal for failure tomeet the "clear and convincing evidence'' standard.Jd. at 109 n.3 (citation 
omitted). 
129. 452 u.s. 18,27-31. 
130. /d. at 28. Lassiter also discussed a parent's interest in the "accuracy and justice" ofa 
parental rights tennination decision. /d. at 27. · 
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presupposes that all issues within the scope ofour adversary system are based 
on binary, opposed interests. This assumption is also at the heart oftheML.B. 
decision. 
The notion of a risk of error is somewhat puzzling in the context of 
termination ofparental rights because the standards are vague, 131 and therefore 
the application ofthe standards to the facts is murky in many instances.132 The 
judicial detennination is very different from that involving application of a 
clear rule. 133 The tennination of parental rights context is radically different 
from the termination of social security benefits context, seen in Mathews v. 
Eldridge. 134 In Santosky v. Kramer135 the Court noted that the substantive 
standards for tenninating parental rights are imprecise and "leave 
derenninations unusually open to the subjective values ofthe judge."136 The 
Court used this observation and other factors to justify a higher standard of 
proof for tennination ofparental rights proceedings than had previously been 
required.137 But if you are requiring clear and convincing evidence of 
something that is vague, the result is not necessarily more accurate than 
requiring a preponderance of the evidence of something that is vague. 
Similarly, ifyou require a right to a transcript in order to appeal a detennination 
that is vague, you will not necessarily gain any more accuracy than ifyou do 
not possess such a transcript Thus, the notion ofa risk oferror is somewhat 
problematic in this area. 
131. See CLARK, supra note 89, § 21.6, at 625 (noting that definitions in termination of 
parental rights statutes are tautological); id. § 21.7, at 632-33 (noting several reasons for the 
vague standards: definitions ofgrounds for involuntary termination ofparental rights vary widely 
betwcea states, a variety ofcircumstances exist where tennination is ordered, stare decisis has 
limited applicability, and courts have widely divergent approaches to similar statutes). 
132. The difficulty ofdetermining whether trial courts have made proper decisions in the 
tennination ofparental rights areas is illustrated by the Mississippi Court ofAppeals ruling in 
M.L.B. which was a divided vote of7-3. M.L.B. v. SL.J., No. 97-CA-00929-COA, 1999 Miss. 
App. LEXIS 299 (M.iss . Ct. App. May 18, 1999). The Mississippi Supreme Court decision 
atlinning the Mississippi Court ofAppeals decision was a divided vote of6-2. M.L.B. v. S.W., 
No. 97-CI'-00929-scr, 2000 Miss. LEXIS 93 (April20, 2000). The various opinions differed 
greatly oonoem.ing the significance ofthe facts found by the Chancellor and the interpretation of 
the legal standard. Thus, one may say that the appeal process corrected the errors ofthe lower 
oourt, but one may also argue that the errors ofthe lower court still are not so clear. 
133. See Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Privole Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. 
L. REv. 1685, 1687, 1688-89 (1976) {noting thatrules in contrasttostandard.s offer certainty and 
reduce arbitrary judicial action). 
134. 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In Mathews, the court noted the continued receipt of social 
securitybenefits was "astatutorily created 'property' interest protected by the Fl.fthAmendmenL" 
/d. at 332. 
135. 455 u.s. 745 {1982). 
136. /d. at 762 (citing Smith v. Org. ofFoster Families, 431 U.S. 816, 835 n.26 {1977)). See 
gtnera/ly Appell, supra note 57, at 580 {detennining "the state,s reasons for both initial and 
continuing intervention are ill-defined and maternally-focused"). 
137. /d. at 764. · 
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Second, the assumptionfound inLassiterand ML.B. thatan"equal contest 
of opposed interests" is the best way to reach "accurate and just results" is 
suspect in the area of family law and, increasingly, in law generally.131 
Mediation, which is increasingly prevalent in family law, questions this 
assumption at a fundamentallevel. 139 It is based on the idea that there are many 
instances where the best way to reach positive outcomes is precisely notto view 
conflicts as the equal contest of opposed interests, but to look for mutually 
acceptable resolutions.140 The trend toward mediation began with family law, 
where mediation is most commonly required.141 
In tennination of parental rights cases, the equal contest of opposed 
interests ofstate and parent may be the least likely route to a positive result for 
children. The decisionmaking process, with its delays, intrusive processes, and 
painful situations can traumatize children. 142 A less confrontational, less 
absolute approach mightwork better in most circumstances for all involved.10 
Similarly, an equal contest of opposed interests ofparents may be the worst 
possible way ofreaching positive results in child custody cases.144 
The idea that the risk of error concept fits uneasily with tennination of 
parental rights litigation also applies to child custody litigation. Yet, risk of 
138. See generally 1NANCYH.RoGERs&CiwoA.McEWEN,MEDIATION: LAW, POLICY 
& PRACTICE (2d. ed. 1994). 
139. See generally id. 
140. See generally id. 
141. /d. § 7.02, at 4. Mediation is seen by some as a response to the indeterminacy ofthe 
best interests ofthe child standard. See CLARK, supra note 89, § 15.2, at 163. Several states have 
programs for mediating termination ofparental rights cases. See Sinden,supranote 57, at 355·58. 
142. In addition to these concerns about the decisionmak:ing process, there are conceptual 
problems with always viewing the issue as solely concerning the state versus parents' interests 
without considering children's infetests. See infra Part ID.D. 
143. However, concerns have also been raised that the mediation process reinforces power 
dynamics that can be undercut somewhat by the fonnality of the litigation process. See, e.g.. 
Penelope E. Bryan, Killing Us Softly: Divorce MediaJion and the Politics ofPower, 40 BUFF. 
L. REv. 441, 445 (1992) (noting that mediation empowers "the already more powerful husband" 
in divorce proceeding to the disadvantage of wife); Trine Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: 
Process Dangersfor Women, tOO Y ALEW.1S45,1549 (1991) (concludingmandatory mediation 
does not provide a more humane or just alternative to the adversarial system); Scott H. Hughes, 
Elizabeth's Story: Exploring Power Imbalances in Divorce Mediation, 8Gro.J. LEOALEnucs 
553, 519-80 (1995) (noting that while mediation can balance power among spouses, there ore 
inherentflaws); Sinden,supra note 57, at 389-91 (noting the effectiveness ofinfonnal procedures 
may be lessened by the disparity of power). For a thoughtful analysis advocating fonnal 
approaches and critiquing approaches such as mediation, see Sinden, supra note 51, at 355-58. 
See also infra Part Ill. C. 
144. The author's experience in supervising third year law students in a clinical program, 
where students practice family law in Maine Courts for four years, is that the assumption that 
contested custody litigation is tern Die for parents and children appears to be universally shared 
by lawyers, judges, and guardians ad litem. · 
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error is not discussed in the context of child custody litigation.145 The best 
interest ofthe child standard is a very vague concept, which may be one reason 
risk oferror is not an explicit consideration. But, ifthe concept ofrisk oferror 
is meaningful in one area of children's legal relationships with their 
parents--tennination ofparental rights-a better explanation is needed as to 
why this concept is not meaningful in a related area-<;ustody litigation. 
Similarly, the idea that an equal contest ofopposed interests may not actually 
lead to positive results in parental rights termination cases also applies to child 
custody disputes. But ifan equal contest ofopposed interests indeed is the best 
way to make decisions about tennination of parental rights, a more robust 
explanation is needed as to why this model works for litigation of parental 
rights1erminationbut not for child custody litigation. Concomitantly, a stronger 
explanation is needed to explain why the constitutional protections that apply 
to litigation oftennination ofparental rights do not apply to parental disputes 
about child custody. 
Concerning parental rights tennination litigation, important questions arise 
concerning the appropriateness ofthe binary rights advocacy framework in all 
instances.146 Risk oferror may not be a sufficiently meaningful concept in this 
context, and the binary advocacy framework may also be inadequate. Other 
approaches such as mediation and changing the requirements for adoption, as 
discussed below, should be considered. 
C. 	 The Lack ofDistinction Between Stepparent Adoptions and Other 
Adoptions 
Justice Ginsburg and Justice Thomas characterizedML.B. v. S.L.J. simply 
as a termination of parental rights case. Neither Justice seemed to view 
stepparent adoption, which constitutes a large proportion of adoptions in the 
United States, 147 as significant to the decision. Even though the state was not 
taking the children away from a custodial parent and placing them with 
strangers, "the challenged state action remains essentially the same: M.L.B. 
resists the imposition of an official decree extinguishing, as no power other 
145. See MAHONEY,supranote 12, at 124;see, e.g., Garskav. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d357, 363 
(W.Va. 1981) (introducing a more determinate "primary caretaker" standard in place ofbest 
interests standard); cj. CLARK. supra note 89, § 20.4, at 494-517. For example, in Troxelv. 
Granville, Justice KeMedy's dissent noted that "[t]he best interests ofthe child standard has at 
times been criticized as indeterminate, leading to unpredictable results." Troxel, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 
2079 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (citing AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRlNCIPLES OF 1lfE LAW OF 
FAMILY DISSOLUTION 2 & n.2 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 1998). Yet, as discussed above, the 
standards for tenninating parental rights also are vague. See supra text accompanying notes 131, 
135-36. 
146. For additional discussion ofthe framework concerning the best interests ofthe child, 
see infra Part ill.D. 
147. 	MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161. 
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than the State c~ her parent-child relationships. " 141 In a sense this concept is 
true-the law of Mississippi and other states treats stepparent adoption the 
same as other adoptions by requiring the termination ofparental rights ofthe 
noncustodial parent before the adoption can take place. 149 
However, different people affected by the controversy may have varying 
perspectives as to whether the challenged state action is essentially the same in 
this and other contexts. For example, ML.B. may view the state action as 
essentially the same whether the children are being placed with a stranger or 
with her former husband ofeighty ears and his new wife. Nonetheless, this does 
not classify the state action as essentially the same from all perspectives. For 
example, from the children's perspective, as articulated by the guardian ad 
litem, the proposed state action apparently was not objectionable as the 
guardian ad litem did not appeal the Chancellor's decision.•so Moreover, the 
state action in allowing stepparent adoptions is very different from a state 
action where a parent's rights are terminated so that the child may be placed 
with strangers. In ML.B. the children were being placed with one person, their 
father, with whom they had a fully formed parental relationship and with whom 
they had been living their entire lives. They were also being placed with his 
new wife, with whom they had been living for at least a year. The state did not 
intrude on an intact family and seize the children or destroy bonds that were 
unfrayed. The state ofMississippi in ML.B. chose one parent over the other, 
which is not unlike the general outcomes ofcustody cases. 
However, the situation ofM.L.B., S.L.J., and their children raises questions 
about whether complete termination of parental rights should be required in 
stepparent and other kinds ofadoptions. The traditional adoption fiction of a 
child being transferred to anew family, with all traces ofthe child's old family 
being obliterated, does not fit this situation nor many other current situations.u• 
The children were six and eight years old when the petition to terminate was 
filed.1s2 The petition did not allege abuse, but claimed that M.L.B. had failed 
to visit regularly and had failed to pay child support. 153 The children may have 
formed important bonds with M.L.B. that would be against their best interests · 
to totally sever. It may also have been in the children's best interest for there to 
be a legally recognized relationship between them and their stepmother, 
148. M.L.B. v. S.W., 519U.S. 10~ 117 n.8 (1996). 
149. See discussion supra note 19. 

ISO. See M.L.B. v. S.U.. No. 95-853, 1996 WL 587663, at •23, 29 (1996). 

151. See Appell. supranote25, at 1008-13; MAHONEY, supranote 12,81162-63; Mahoney, 
supra note 19, at 101. 
152. M.L.B., 519 U.S. at 107. 
153. /d. M.L.B. testified thatthe reason she stopped paying child support was "because the 
plaintiffwould not allow her visitation." M.L.B. v. S.LJ., No. 97:CA-009290-COA, 1999 Miss. 
App. LEXIS 299, at •t9. 
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J.P.J.154 Under these circumstances, it is not clear that the law should require 
such an absolute termination in all adoptions.155 
Various commentators and courts have advocated more flexible options. 156 
The Uniform Adoption Act allows for the possibility ofpost-adoption visitation 
rights for the former noncustodial parent after a stepparent adoption. 157 For 
example, why not allow J.P .J. to adopt the children and still allow M.L.B. and 
the children the opportunity to visit one another?158 Why not have an adoption 
certificate recognizing J.P.J. as a parent to the children, but not obliterate the 
initial birth certificate? Why do we characterize parental rights in this binary 
fashion when relationships are more complex than that? The open or 
collaborative adoption movement has various proposals allowing for a more 
nuanced approach.159 
The state's requirement ofabsolute termination is part ofwhat leads to the 
perceived needfor constitutional protections. Since the deprivation is complete, 
the process that is due is correspondingly greater. If the deprivation had not 
been complete, lesser due process protections should beacceptable. Moreover, 
this would probably facilitate the adoption process, in stepparent cases and 
other cases, by making a consent to termination ofone's parental rights less 
absolute and less stigmatizing. Many situations exist where a parent is 
genuinely overwhelmed and is willing to allow an ex-partner or foster parents 
to adopt the child, but retaining some connection, such as annually receiving 
154. Particularly as M.L.B. did not want custody but only wanted visitation, itmight have 
made sense to have a legally recognized relationship between the children and their stepmother 
in the eventofJ.P.J!s death. See Mahoney, supra note 19, at 108 (noting that prior to adoption. 
legal relationship ofstepparent and child is an "uncertain affair," but once adoption is final, rights 
and duties of stepparent are the same as those ofany other parent). See generally MAHONEY, 
supra note 12, at 177-78 (describing the legal consequences ofstepparent adoption). 
155. It is similarly unclear why termination needs to be so stigmatizing. Justice Ginsburg 
refers repeatedly to the "brand" associated with parental rights terminations. ML.B., S 19 U.S. at 
125. She analogizes ~nnination proceedings to criminal misdemeanor convictions. ld a~ 120, 
122-23, 125. Justice Ginsburg's tone may imply that they are worse than misdemeanor 
convictions./d For a different perspective on this analogy, see Sinden, supra note 57, at 344--50. 
156. See, e.g.,Appell,supranote 25, at 1010~55 (discussjng options for open or cooperative 
adoptions); MAHONEY, supra note 12, at 161-89 (discussing stepparent adoptions). 
157. See Mahoney, supra note 19, at 100. 
158. According to the Chancellor, M.L.B.on cross-examination by the guardian ad litem 
testified to the following: 
She testified that she was not complaining about the children living with 
their father, she knows that they are being well taken care of. She was 
concerned about the telephone calls and having the right to converse with 
her children. She said she had no doubt thatJ.P.J. [the stepmother] loves the 
children and she loves them also. Itused to bother her for the children to call 
J .P J. 'mother,' but she now understands. She is willing topay child support, 
provide medical insurance, but she wants visitation. 
M.L.B., 1999 Miss. App. LEXIS 299, at *20-21. 
159. See, e.g., Appell, supra note 25, at 1010-49 (discussing the utility ofopen adoptions 
and providing examples ofcooperative adoption practiceS). 
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pictures ofthe child, makes the parent's consentto absolute termination ofher 
parental rights psychologically possible.160 The absoluteness ofparental rights 
and the rigidity ofthe adoption framework make this kind ofresolution harder. 
Legislative and judicial efforts to craft practical solutions for adoption 
dilemmas should be applauded. 
D. The Continued Invisibility ofChildren 
Children are invisible in both Justice Ginsburg's opinion and in the 
dissenting opinions. Justice Ginsburg writes that the Court is "[g]uided by 
Lassiter and Santosky, and other decisions acknowledging the primacy ofthe 
parent-child relationship."161 The Court's references to the "parent-child 
relationship, in those decisions indicate an acknowledgment ofthe two-way 
nature ofthat relationship: the child's relationship with the parents and the 
parents' relationship with the child. However, those decisions only concern the 
latter half ofthat relationship: the parents' relationship with their child. The 
National Center for Youth Law and other groups filed an amicus curiae brief 
urging the Court to consider "not only the fundamental rights ofparents, but the 
fundamental rights ofchildren to a parent-child relationship.''162 None ofthe 
opinions by the United States Supreme Court or the Mississippi courts mention 
this brief. None ofthe Justices acknowledge the invisibility of children163 or 
mention the possible effect ofthe decision itself on the children.164 
160. The drafters of the stepparent visitation provisions of the Unifonn Adoption Act 
assumed that this would be the case. Mahoney, supra note 19, at 104. This is confinned 
anecdotally through various conversations with attorneys and guardians nd litem. E.g., 
Conversation with Cushman Anthony, Esq. and Caroline Gardiner, Esq., in Portland, Me. 
(December 7, 1999). 
161. M.L.B. v. SLJ., 519 U.S. 102. 120 (1996) (citations omitted). 
162. BriefofAmici CuriaeNational CenterforYoulhLawetal. at •4,M.L.B. v. S.W.,S19 
U.S. 102 (1996) (No. 95-853), available at1996 WL 294200. 
163. Interestingly, in Troxel v. Granville, Justice Stevens• dissent highlights the issue of 
children's interests and states that "it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and 
families have fundamental h'berty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do 
children have these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation [of 
parent's interest versus state's interest].'' Troxel, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2072 (2000). Neither the 
conCWTeoces nor the dissents explicitly discuss the liberty interests of children. See supra note 
9. 
164. The litigation probably was confusing for the children, who found that five and n hnlf 
years after M.L.B.'s parental rights had been terminated and they had been adopted by their 
stepmother, M.L.B.'s parental rights actually had been improperly tenninated and that they had 
not been adopted after all. See supra notes 76-79. One cone~ is whether the resolution ofthese 
kinds ofcases should take as long as it does. 
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As noted above, under Mississippi law, a guardian ad litem has to be 
appointed when an adoption involves termination of parental rights. 165 The 
guardian is not mentioned in the Court's opinion, but it was mentioned in the 
oral argument that a guardian ad litem had been appointed who could have 
appealed but did not. 166 One ofthe Justices also suggested that the child's due 
process interest was the same as the parent.167 1n Justice Ginsburg's and Justice 
Thomas' framework ofparental rights versus the state, children are remarkably 
absent In that sense, the decision is in line with the decisions protecting 
parents' rights to raise children, such as Meyer v. Nebraska168 and Pierce v. 
Society ofSisters,169 which are thoughtfully characterized by one commentator 
as cases about ownership ofchildren.170 
The issue of how to identify the interests of children is challenging. In 
termination proceedings, the issue is framed simply as the interests ofthe state 
versus the interests ofthe parent or parents. Although Justice Ginsburg states 
that the court must examine "closely and contextually" the governmental 
interest advanced in support of the intrusion, 171 the interest advanced by the 
state was purely financial. 172 Because the governmental interest was conceived 
in such a constricted way, it is not surprising that even a contextual examination 
resulted in the dismissal of the government's interest!73 However, in family 
165. MISS. CODE ANN.§ 93-15-107(1) (Supp. 2000). See E.M.C. v. S.V.M., 695 So. 2d 
576, 581 (Miss. 1997) (holding failure to appoint a guardian ad litem for a child in a tennination 
ofparental rights proceeding was reversible error). 
166. See supra note 34. 
167. A portion of the transcript indicates the Justice's suggestion that the due process 
interests for parent and child are the same: 
"Q: It is true, is it not, that the child has to be represented separately in the proceeding? 
A: Yes, your Honor. 
Q: And that' s a matter ofdue process, too, I would suppose, because the child's rights are as 
vitally afmcted as either set ofparents." 
See Transcript at *28, M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102(1996) (No. 95-853),available at 1996 WL 
587663. This statement is incorrect because the Court has recognized lesser constitutional rlghts 
for children. See, e.g., Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130.32 (1989)(finding a child does 
not have a constitutionally protected interest in maintaining a relationship with the biological 
father where that interest conflicts with constitutionally protected interest oflegal father). The 
transcriptdoes not identify which Justice asked the question. The author spoke with the attorneys 
who were involved with the case and found the attorneys could not remember who asked the 
question. Based on Justice Stevens' focus on the children's interest in his dissent, it seems that 
the question may have been posed by Justice Stevens. 
168. 262 u.s. 390 (1923). 
169. 268 u.s. 510 (1925). 
170. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, "Who Owns the Child?": Meyer and Pierce and 
the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REv. 995, 997 {1992). 
171. M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 116 (1996). 
172. /d. at 122. 
173. The Court in Santosky v. Kramer had already stated that a parent's interest was more 
precious than money, 455 U.S. 745, 758-59 (1982). Thus, it is unsurprising in M.L.B. that the 
parental interest outweighed the state's financial interesL · 
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law, the state is supposed to have a parens patriae interest in the well-being of 
children.174 Thus, in termination proceedings, the state interest should be seen 
not simply as an external power opposing the parent but rather as an interest 
aligned with the child's interests. However, this is difficult because in some 
instances as the interest in the well-being of children is met by having the 
children stay with their parents, 17s while in other instances it will be met by 
removing them from their parents' custody •176 Nonetheless, to conceive ofthe 
state's interest in a particular tennination procedure as merely financial seems 
to define the state's interest in an overly constricted fashion. 
Legal scholars have been developing theories regarding the associational 
rights and interests of children. Gilbert Holmes has cogently argued that 
"children's liberty interests in familial relationships" should receive 
constitutional recognition. 177 Barbara Bennett Woodhouse argues that "our 
attachment to [the] property-based notion ofthe private child cuts offa more 
fruitful consideration of the rights of all children to safety, nurture, and 
stability, to a voice, and to membership in the national family." 171 Katherine 
Federle proposes an empowerment model for children. 179 Bruce and Jonathan 
Hafen argue that rights-based frameworks often are inappropriate for 
children.110MarthaMinow acknowledges that while the language ofrights does 
not fit all children's situations, it can be used in some situations to "reach the 
realities of children's lives."181 When it does not fit children's lives, other 
language must be used "to ta1k about children's needs and society's 
responsibilities. " 112 A comprehensive theory ofchildren's rights or interests has 
not been developed, and it may be that no single theory will be sufficient to 
174. See Troxel v. Granville, 120 S. Ct 2054,2072 {2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting 
that the state's interest as parens patriae must be balanced against a parent's interest in a child). 
The Court's powers to deal both with custody ofchildren as between parents, and protection of 
children from parents, derive from the parens patriae power. CLARK, supra note 89, § 20.1, at 
476-77. 
175. Santosky, 455 u.s:at 766-67. 
176. /d. at 767 & n.17. The Santoskymajority claims that the parens patriae interest only 
arises "at the disposition phase, after the parents have been found unfit." /d. The dissent 
contemplates an earlier alignment between the child's interest and the state's interest and 
considers the child's interest separate from the parent's interest/d. at 788 n.l3. The scope and 
meaning of the parens patriae power is not clear from the Court's decisions and has not been 
clarified by Troxel v. Granville. See supra notes 9, 163, 174. 
177. Gilbert A. Holmes, The 1ie That Binds: The Constitutional Right ofChildren to 
Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 Mo. L. REv. 358, 385 (I994). 
178. Woodhouse, supra note 170, at 1002, 1112-22. 
179. KatherineHuntFederle,LookingAhead: AnEmpowermentPerspectiveonlheRights 
ofChildren, 68 TEMP. L.REv. 1585, 1585-86 (1995). 
180. Bruce C. Hafen &Jonathan 0. Hafen,Abandoning Children to Their Autonomy: 17re 
United Nations Convention on the Rights ofthe Child, 37 HAR.v.lNT'L.LJ. 449, 450-S 1{1996). 
181. Martha Minow, Children's Rights: Where We've Been, and Where We 're Going, 68 
TEMP. L. Rsv. 1573, 1583 {1995). 
182. /d. 
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deal with all issues ofparents, children, and the state. 183 However, we need to 
continueto think ofways to include children inthe legal frameworks that apply 
to their lives. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
ML.B. v. S.L.J. presents opportunities to analyze the parental rights 
framework and the family law issues to which it relates in new ways. 
Tennination ofparental rights decisions are not as distinct from child custody 
decisions for indigent parents as the law assumes. The adversary framework, 
with its assumption ofriskoferror, may not be the most suitable framework for 
termination ofparental rights in all instances, despite its application inML.B. 
and other termination ofparental rights cases. Modifying traditional adoption 
doctrines to recognize different approaches that might work in stepparent and 
other adoption contexts is one way to move away from the simplistic 
framework we currently use. Last, we need to continue to explore ways to 
expand our consideration ofthe children's interests. 
183. For example, Emily Buss recently developed a theory for dealing with the free exercise 
rights ofchildren, based on an analogy between exercise ofreligious freedom and abortion rights. 
Emily Buss, What Does Frieda Yoder Believe?, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 53,74-76 (1999). This 
framework may be appropriate for children's free exercise rights, but not for custody 
determinations. ld. at 76. See generally Sean Ireland, Children as Legal Persons: Defining 
Standards Through Judicial Discretion (unpublished paper on file with the author). 
